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THE MORAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTRACT
PETER A. ALCES*
Contract theory is incoherent; so Contract is amoral. Let me
explain.
The function of theory is heuristic. The object of theory is either
normative or positive. The best theorists are able to blur the
distinction, often for rhetorical purposes. Legal theory (at least
in some of its iterations) depends upon a posited conception of
doctrine (and doctrine, too, is heuristic). That is, theory either
explains or corrects doctrine.' To accomplish that, legal theory is
dependent upon a theory of legal doctrine. Contract theory, whether
deontological, consequentialist, or pluralist, begins and must end
with the doctrine, and must have something to say about doctrine
that serves a heuristic purpose (as well as, perhaps, other purposes).
My interest is not so much with what Contract theorizing tells us,
heuristically, about Contract doctrine; my concern is more with
what Contract theory, in all of its extant phases, assumes about the
nature of Contract doctrine. In this paper, I will engage each of the
foregoing observations about the theory-doctrine dynamic and try
to say something by drawing conclusions about the relationships
among them.
In efforts to formulate the deontological or consequentialist
conceptions of Contract, or to demonstrate that Contract is neither
wholly explicable in terms of one or the other type of theory, claims
are necessarily made about the nature of Contract as a body of
doctrine, claims about what doctrine is. I do not mean simply that
theorists disagree about what a particular doctrine entails, such
* Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, the College of William & Mary School of Law. I am
indebted to Brian Bix, Michael Green, and James Dwyer for comments on earlier drafts of
this manuscript and to my research assistants, Jason Hopkins, Christine Tartamella, and
Nicole Travers.
1. Theory can reveal the implicit unity of its subject, here Contract. See Peter Benson,
The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118, 125 (Peter
Benson ed., 2001).
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as what a court should do in order to apply, for example, the con-
sideration, frustration, or unconscionability doctrines correctly. I
acknowledge that reasonable minds disagree about the substance
and constituents of those common law Contract doctrines. That is
not my point. Instead, I am curious about what it means for a set of
rules (say, the set of rules that fixes the parameters of "agreement")
to be doctrine, the phenomenon that theory would try to explain.
Heretofore we have assumed the accessibility of doctrine as an
idea set. Though we might disagree about the theory or theories
needed to make sense of that idea set (or the relationship among
plural theories), we have largely taken for granted that we are all
talking about the same kind of thing when we use the term "doc-
trine" to describe what it is theory rationalizes. Examination of the
nature of doctrine qua doctrine could reveal something that would
explain why particular Contract theory fits particular doctrine
uneasily and why Contract theory generally cannot do the work we
would have it do, as we would have it do that work. If we were able
to arrive at an adequate Contract theory, we would have established
the perspective from which to explain2 and correct. We could
appraise the efficacy of certain Contract rules and the results of
those rules' application and operation in terms of the theory. In
other words, if Contract theory tells us that Contract accomplishes
X, we could decide that Contract fails or succeeds in terms of its
realization of the goal Contract theory has identified. For example,
were Contract really about facilitating Pareto superior moves, we
could consider a Contract rule's operation and decide whether it
serves or frustrates that object. Alternatively, if Contract is about
autonomy, we could appraise its efficacy at vindicating free will, or
a particular deontological theory's conception of autonomy. To the
extent that theory is serving a positive function, we could test a
particular theory's ability to tell the future, notwithstanding
epistemological limitations that might frustrate the predictive
efficacy of even the best theory.3 But ultimately, I argue, we cannot
2. See T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 1, 86, 88-93 (positing theoretical basis of Contract's expectation rather than reliance
measure of damages).
3. The so-called "Hand Formula" serves this function in the negligence law. See United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947) (Hand, J.) ("[L]iability depends upon
whether B [burden] is less than L [injury] multiplied by P [probability] ...."). It may be that
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arrive at an adequate Contract theory, one that can appraise and
predict Contract doctrine, because Contract doctrine resists theory.
My conclusion is that, given the nature of Contract doctrine,
theory cannot make sense of Contract, that is, cannot make sense
of Contract in any way particularly useful to morality. So, at least
as far as theory is concerned, Contract is a failure, an abject
failure at that. It does not "fly," at least it certainly should not. But
bumble-bee-like it does. Somehow it does. How can that be? I
propose that Contract seems not to fly as a theoretical matter
because we have misunderstood (or, perhaps, incompletely under-
stood) the fit between theory and doctrine. Once we appreciate the
theory-doctrine fit, in terms of Contract, we will see how it is that
Contract flies, such as it does.
There is something artificial in the lines Contract theory would
draw, so therefore something imprecise about the way we would
determine what (doctrine) Contract must explain. If we say that our
theory of Contract must account for why it is that certain promises
are enforceable at law (which seems a pretty good shorthand for the
task confronting Contract theory), then does that theory as well
have to explain the consequences of promise breach, the damages,
or what it means "to enforce" a promise? And if those damages are
not always based on the bargain, but say, the expectation interest,
does Contract theory have to tell us why Contract can settle on a
different measure? If that different measure is indistinct from
damages based on another theory, such as restitution or promissory
estoppel, does a theory of Contract have to explain why that other
measure is appropriate (or inappropriate)?
The temptation to limit the work we would have Contract theory
do is powerful. It is usually easier to explain less than it is to
explain more. But we fail to explain all that we need to explain at
Tort is more normatively coherent than Contract, if, in fact, the Hand Formula accurately
captures Tort and provides a basis for explanation and correction.
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our peril: if our theory under-explains, it is not a theory of Contract.4
There are two phases of that conclusion.
First, a theory of Contract must explain the work that Contract
does. If we look to Contract to determine the rights of parties to a
consensual relation, when events subsequent to the formation of
their contract reveal gaps in their understanding, Contract should
provide an answer. So Charles Fried, as far as I am concerned,
conceded the failure of his promise theory when he concluded that
"[iut would be irrational to ignore the gaps in contracts, to refuse
to fill them. It would be irrational not to recognize contractual
accidents and to refuse to make adjustments when they occur. The
gaps cannot be filled, the adjustments cannot be governed, by the
promise principle."5 It is all right that Fried so fixes the limits of his
promise principle, but then it would be best to conclude that the
4. Stephen Smith has identified "four types of accounts" that "are possible of any area
of the law: (1) historical, (2) prescriptive, (3) descriptive, and (4) interpretive." STEPHEN A.
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 4 (2004). Like Smith, I am interested in a Contract Theory that
would describe or interpret what it is Contract does. The object of interpretive theory is to
reveal an "intelligible order in the [Contract] law." Id. at 5. Insofar as I conclude that Contract
is incoherent it might seem that I have foreclosed the possibility of discerning any intelligible
order in the Contract law. But that is not so. There are ways to make sense of Contract's
object (or objects) and then to devise an account of how Contract principles go about
accomplishing that object. So perhaps the term "t" suggests a conceptual integrity that is
missing in the Contract law in fact without forsaking the descriptive or interpretive efforts
so long as those efforts proceed from the right level of acuity or coarse graininess. A pointillist
landscape or newspaper photo is incoherent if we do not achieve sufficient remove, and would
be similarly incoherent even from the proper distance unless we had the terms to make sense
of it. Similarly the coherence of any area of the law is a function of the perceptual range (the
coarse graininess) and the acuity of our perceptual equipment. Contract at some level of
abstraction may be described or interpreted, then, so long as we have (1) the vocabulary to
formulate what Contract in fact accomplishes, as well as (2) the normative structures
(deontological and consequential) into which we may translate it. A description of Contract,
for example, as alternatively promise-based for consequentialist purposes and reliance-based
for deontological purposes might be coherent; but it might not be morally coherent if our
object is to discern a morality of Contract law.
Contract theory is incoherent, then, only insofar as it has, heretofore, failed to offer an
account of Contract doctrine and its relation to what Contract accomplishes-what Contract
does in fact-and the normative mission of Contract. Only if such an account were available
would we be able to conclude that Contract theory is coherent in terms that would inform a
moral perspective.
5. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 69
(1981). Fried's inability to extend his promise theory to all of Contract does, though, provide
a good argument for the position that Contract is not just a matter of promising, and that has
consequences for theories of Contract generally.
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promise principle only explains some of Contract-that part of
Contract which Fried believes is based on promise; his is not a
theory of Contract.
Second, though a theory of Contract must not embrace legal
mistakes, decisions where the courts simply get it wrong, the theory
must correct mistakes. Indeed, that is a principal role of theory:
theory separates the chaff from the grain. But "mistake" becomes a
matter of experience. If a "mistake" happens frequently enough, or
is followed often enough (and it is not clear what "enough" would
certainly be) then it becomes part of Contract and our theory of
Contract must account for it. That does not mean that the theory
could not provide the means to compare resolutions of recurring
controversies and indicate the superiority of one over another; to the
contrary, theory must provide the means to do that. So if Peevyhouse
v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.6 reached the correct conclusion, and
Groves v. John Wunder Co.7 reached the wrong conclusion, theory
needs to tell us why that is so. In fact, I would go so far as to say
that a (perhaps "the") test of a theory is its ability to tell us which
of two divergent contracts decisions is correct and why, or at least
why what appear to be divergent decisions in fact are not.8 A theory
which cannot do that is not a theory of Contract, though it may be
a theory of something else, such as "promising,"9 that would have
significance (perhaps even legal significance) both within and
without Contract.
Those two objects of the theoretical enterprise---"explanation" and
"correction" would be a useful shorthand--determine, then, the sum
and substance of the theoretical enterprise. ' The observations
6. 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1963) ("[W]here the economic benefit which would result to
lessor by full performance of the work is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance,
the damages which lessor may recover are limited to the diminution in value resulting to the
premises because of the non-performance.").
7. 286 N.W. 235, 238 (Minn. 1939) (awarding damages based on cost rather than value
of performance).
8. A theory of Contract would also have to explain why two common law legal systems
can reach different conclusions regarding the operation of fundamental principles; for
example, why promissory estoppel may be used offensively or defensively in the United States
but only defensively under English law. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 233-34.
9. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10. This may posit a functional theory of theory. On functionalist theories in the law
generally, see Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAw THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 188, 189 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
2007] 1651
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about the relationship between doctrine and theory that follow
concern the nature of doctrine that theory must understand in order
for theory to be able to explain and correct. What has been lacking
in theoretical study of Contract heretofore has been an appreciation
of the nature of doctrine in its relation to theory. Theory not
grounded in a proper appreciation of the nature of doctrine cannot
be coherent theory because it cannot explain and correct. And mor-
ally motivated Contract theory that cannot serve normative
functions-explanation and correction-ultimately can only be
amoral.
Part I of this Essay will present an important but not atypical
doctrinal challenge: the nature of agreement after Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.' That presenta-
tion will set the stage by providing the opportunity to posit con-
cretely the nature of doctrinal inquiry Contract theory must engage.
But still before we can appraise the value of coming to terms with
the nature of Contract doctrine and its relation to theory, it is
worthwhile to present the prevailing iterations of Contract theory,
in broad categories. Part II will do that, albeit summarily, and will
take account of both "horizontal" and "vertical" conceptions of
theories' interrelation as a concession to pluralism. But just as a
theory will not do the work we need Contract theory to do, an
amalgam of theories too will not quite do the trick. Even such an
amalgam would have to understand doctrine differently than we
now do in order to convince. Part III will formulate doctrine in
terms that (1) are true to doctrine's operation, and (2) reveal why no
single theory of Contract or single theory of Contract theories can
fly. Part IV concludes.
I. A STUDY IN CONTRACT DOCTRINE: "AGREEMENT"
At the outset it is worthwhile to offer a concrete illustration of the
type of subject matter for which Contract doctrine and Contract
theory must account.
11. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
1652 [Vol. 48:1647
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ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg has become an "instant classic."12 The
transactional context is familiar: Zeidenberg went into a store that
sold packaged computer software and purchased ProCD's product,
essentially an electronic phone directory. Terms disclosed within the
box and terms disclosed when Zeidenberg launched the software
limited his rights to disseminate the information contained on the
software. Zeidenberg ignored the term limiting his right of dissemi-
nation and ProCD brought an action to enjoin his (mis)use of the
product. Zeidenberg responded that his contract with ProCD was
formed when he paid for the software and left the store with it.
Anything proposed or imposed by ProCD in the box or on the
12. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430 n.43 (2d Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing "assent first, terms later" software purchases from "pay now, terms later"
arrangements such as that in ProCD); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1997) (applying ProCD to the sale of a boxed computer and noting that "[p]laintiffs ask
us to limit ProCD to software, but where's the sense in that? ProCD is about the law of
contract, not the law of software."). But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d
91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Because a purchaser ... has actually obtained the product, the
purchaser may use it despite the refund offer, regardless of the additional terms specified
after the contract formed.").
The commentary aligns largely against Judge Easterbrook. See Roger C. Bern, "Terms
Later" Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge
Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POLY 641, 643 (2004) ("Judge Easterbrook's
imposition of the 'terms later' contracting rule in ProCD and Hill was itself devoid of legal,
economic, and moral sanction. Thus his opinions in those cases provide no legitimate support
for other court decisions or for any uniform law that would validate 'terms later'
contracting."); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 487 (1998) ("Mhe opportunity to engage in
comparison shopping, so important to the court in theory, does not seem particularly
attractive if one must purchase each product to learn the terms governing its use."); Clayton
P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 682 (noting that
cases that adopt ProCD "appear motivated by the utility and practicality of easy forms of
contracting, and at least some approving opinions seem to fly in the face of doctrinal
analysis").
Other commentators, however, have urged an expansion of ProCD. See John A. Rothchild,
The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 45 & n.159 (2004) (citing ProCD as support for a software publisher seeking to
enforce a "clickwrap" agreement); Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and
the Common Law "Mailbox Rule,"56 BAYLOR L. REv. 175, 188-89 (2004) ("While ProCD is not
an electronic contracting case and was not governed by the [Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act] ... the official comments to the UCITA note that ProCD's 'layered'
contracting approach, in which the moment of contract formation is not clear, is the approach
adopted by the UCITA." (footnotes omitted)).
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computer screen thereafter could not be part of the parties' "agree-
ment.'
Judge Easterbrook's analysis misunderstood the meaning and
application of three Uniform Commercial Code sections. 14 And it is
not clear that the U.C.C. was in the least pertinent to the issue
presented." His analysis of the apposite Contract doctrine, though,
is revealing, and demonstrates well the significance of doctrine
to theory. You cannot explain (or even posit) the theoretical basis
of Contract until you first determine what Contract is, and what
Contract is is what Contract doctrine determines it to be. It is
worthwhile, then, to sketch Easterbrook's conception of the agree-
ment doctrine.
The opinion starts with the recognition that "[i]n Wisconsin, as
elsewhere [everywhere?], a contract includes only the terms on
which the parties have agreed."'6 So agreement does not just matter;
it is determinative. Easterbrook then seems to shift gears and allow
that the fact of actual agreement is not determinative; what matters
instead, apparently, is the agreement to be bound without actual
agreeing: "Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable ...
may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers
alike."' 7 That conclusion is explained and justified in two ways: (1)
by the efficiencies effected by standardized forms, and (2) by
examples of standardized forms the enforceability of which we take
for granted (or which courts have confirmed).'" Here some of
Easterbrook's reasoning becomes elusive. For example, he suggests
that consumers really do (and need to) read the package insert that
describes drug interactions in the drugs they buy.' s Nonetheless, the
13. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
14. He misunderstands the application and operation of U.C.C. §§ 2-204 (which actually
deals with the timing of acceptance), 2-207 (which applies even in the case of a single form),
and 2-606 (which concerns acceptance of contract subject matter, goods, not acceptance of
offers at the formation stage).
15. The issue presented was one of contract formation and so a matter of the common law
contract. See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2004).
16. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
17. Id. at 1451.
18. Id.
19. Id. ("Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside and an elaborate package
insert on the inside. The package insert describes drug interactions, contraindications, and
1654 [Vol. 48:1647
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point is not that Easterbrook's conclusion is curious; the point is
that his conclusion is Contract doctrine. Pro CD is law, Contract law,
and its rule is part of Contract doctrine. It tells us what agreement,
the foundation of Contract, is. That is true whether or not all other
courts agree with Easterbrook on this point.2° ProCD is not an
aberration. It seems to be entirely consistent with Carnival Cruise
other vital information-but, if Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the package
insert, because it is not part of the contract."). It is hard to tell, but does Easterbrook really
think a seller of drugs with potentially fatal interactions could insulate itself from liability to
a consumer by simply listing those interactions on a package insert?
20. Some courts have criticized the Seventh Circuit's ruling in ProCD v. Zeidenberg. The
United States District Court in Kansas, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340
(D. Kan. 2000), disagreed with Easterbrook's assertion that the vendor is the master of the
offer. The district court, unlike the Seventh Circuit, applied U.C.C. § 2-207 to the additional
terms. Id. The terms and conditions mailed with the computer represented a counteroffer that
would not become part of the agreement unless the consumer explicitly accepted them. See
id. at 1341. Courts have distinguished the shrinkwrap agreement in ProCD from situations
in which the consumer is bound to terms before having an opportunity to click "I agree" or
otherwise manifest assent. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428-29 (2d Cir.
2004); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585,592-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd,
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). One court has denied that, under the analysis of ProCD, consent
was given when a customer continued to receive satellite service after an arbitration clause
was added to the contract. Mattingly v. Hughes Elec. Corp., 810 A.2d 498, 508 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2002).
Generally, however, the reaction to ProCD has been positive. Courts have supported
Easterbrook's holding that contracts can be formed after the customer purchases the product,
receives the conditions, and retains the product after having an opportunity to read the terms.
See Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 1996);
Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105-06 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Lozano v. AT & T
Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974, 977-78 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me.
2005); 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913, at *2 (Mass. App. Div. Feb.
21, 2003); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Levy
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Licitra
v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001). Other courts have used ProCD
to uphold the validity of shrinkwrap, browsewrap, and cickwrap agreements. See O'Quin v.
Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516-17 (M.D. La. 2003) (shrinkwrap); i.Lan Sys., Inc.
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (D. Mass. 2002) (cickwrap);
Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (browsewrap); Rinaldi
v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at **3-4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
1999) (shrinkwrap); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp.
2d 519, 527-28 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (shrinkwrap); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (cickwrap); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305, 312-13 (Wash. 2000) (shrinkwrap).
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Lines,2 a case upon which Judge Easterbrook relied, and which has
been good law for quite some time.
So the issue, for purposes of discerning Contract doctrine, may be
put in these stark terms: is actual agreement necessary for Contract
formation? If actual agreement is necessary, then it makes sense to
talk about autonomy and rational choice; that is, it makes sense to
understand "Contract" in the familiar sense. But if the basis of
Contract liability is not in fact actual agreement, in the form of real,
knowing consent to terms, then conceptions of autonomy and
rational choice apply quite differently, if at all. Once autonomy and
rational choice are gone, there is not much of Contract, as a basis of
consensual liability, that remains. Further, if the same conse-
quences may attend your actions whether or not those actions were
in fact consensual (the product of actual rather than inferred
agreement) then it would be impossible to provide a coherent basis
of such consensual liability.
The ProCD decision and its engagement of the foundation of
Contract-agreement-is just an example. But I would argue that
similarly broad swaths of Contract present similar challenges to
Contract theory;22 but space and time preclude that further study
just now.
II. THE PHASES OF CONTRACT THEORY
Theories of Contract are generally either deontological,
consequentialist, or plural (some combination of the deontological
and the consequentialist). Professor Gordley, though, has carefully
demonstrated the ultimate deficiencies of the deontological and con-
sequentialist perspectives and discovered that both need something
like Aristotelian "prudence" to ground their commentary.3
It may be that for Contract, deontology and consequentialism
in their autonomy and utilitarian elaborations are merely two
21. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (finding a forum selec-
tion clause printed on a cruise ticket to be enforceable).
22. The courts' and jurisdictional divergence on issues such as the preexisting legal duty
rule, whether moral obligation can support consideration, and terminable at will "contracts"
present exemplary contexts.
23. See James Gordley, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 1, at 265.
1656 [Vol. 48:1647
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perspectives of the same conclusion.24 Autonomy, we may conclude,
is vindicated by utility-that is, the measure of your autonomy is
your ability to accumulate the things that have utility for you.
Utility, in turn, may require autonomy-you cannot make value-
maximizing (rational) choices unless you enjoy autonomy, the power
to determine your own choices. If those equations (or, at least,
symbioses) are trenchant, then it will not be difficult for us to
translate doctrine into either deontological or consequentialist
terms. Whether the deontology-consequentialist dichotomy admits
of resolution in normative theory generally (a point which I need not
certainly determine for present purposes), in Contract the tension
is obscured by the doctrine.
Differences of opinion, then, about whether a particular Contract
doctrine is informed by autonomy, a deontological concern, or utility,
a consequentialist concern, could reduce to semantic quibbles, or, at
most, questions about whether we have gotten (or would even be
able to get) the math right. For example, and to draw further on the
foregoing presentation of ProCD, does Easterbrook's understanding
and application of his sense of "agreement" serve interests in
autonomy or utility (or both, or neither)? The answer must be "it
depends," and it depends on who the beneficiary/victim of the
analysis is and what we conceive the autonomy/utility interests (and
their relationship) to entail.
The analysis Easterbrook pursues at first seems to focus on
utility: transaction costs are reduced by the law's permitting (even
encouraging) the use of standard forms.25 So if we conclude that a
standard form can accomplish "agreement," even when there is little
or no evidence of actual agreement, the law increases utility. But it
may be that the law's accommodating ProCD and Zeidenberg's
bargain (even if Zeidenberg were not ultimately pleased with the
bargain) both vindicated their autonomy and did so at the least
cost to them. Indeed, had the law not construed "agreement" as
Easterbrook concluded it did, the parties would not, certainly at the
margin, have had the ability to realize and enjoy the fruits of their
autonomy. Paternalistic law undermines autonomy just as it may
24. See, e.g., id. at 270.
25. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
20071 1657
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frustrate utility.2" So you could tell either a deontological or
consequentialist story about Easterbrook's ProCD opinion. The
terms of the opinion accommodate both perspectives: "Zeidenberg's
position ... must be that the printed terms on the outside of a box
are the parties' contract--except for printed terms that refer to or
incorporate other terms. But why would Wisconsin fetter the parties'
choice in this way?"27 And then the justification for standard forms
is presented in utilitarian terms as Easterbrook quotes the commen-
tary to section 211 of the Second Restatement of Contracts:
"Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions
as standardization of goods and services; both are essential to a
system of mass production and distribution." 8 The opinion is not
confused; both justifications, the deontological and the con-
sequentialist, point in the same direction.
Some commentators, however, have either assumed or asserted
that the deontological and the consequentialist will point in opposite
directions, so that it would be necessary to follow one path or the
other. Most recently (and perhaps most notably) Professors Alan
Schwartz and Robert Scott,29 following the lead of Professors
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ° concluded that at least in
the case of firm-to-firm31 contracting, consequentialist-specifically,
26. Though for some-the uninformed or those with bad judgment, for
example-paternalistic law functions well: they are better off if decisions are made for them
rather than by them. I am indebted to Brian Bix for this observation.
27. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-51 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 1451 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)).
29. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
30. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961
(2001).
31. The commentators recognize that what constitutes a firm is crucial, so they offer a
definition:
Any effort to analyze contracts between "firms" thus confronts a boundary
issue-how to define a firm for purposes of the analysis. We draw this boundary
here by defining a ... firm as (1) an entity that is organized in the corporate form
and that has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a
professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 29, at 545. You wonder why the authors could not have just
divided the world between contracts where the parties are interested solely in wealth-
maximization and contracts in which other interests are implicated. Surely there are
individuals more interested in pure wealth-maximization than may be "firms" like
Greenpeace or Amnesty International, for example. But Schwartz and Scott do refine their
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efficiency-norms should be the sole source of reference for the
resolution of Contract controversies.3" They begin from the empirical
judgment that most of the controversies addressed by the common
law of contract and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code are
such firm-to-firm contracts.33 Firms do not have the same interest
in autonomy that individuals may have and so there is no reason to
vindicate that deontological goal at the expense of efficiency. The
object of firms is wealth maximization so everything, then, may
resolve nicely and neatly into matters of efficiency.
Schwartz and Scott illustrate the consequences of their perspec-
tive and conclusion by considering the parol evidence rule, a
doctrinal concept certainly akin to agreement. In explaining what
courts should do under the U.C.C. version of the rule,34 the authors
conclude that a less strict ("soft" version) of the rule should be
employed "if courts should consider all evidence that may bear on
what the parties meant; it is not justifiable if courts should consider
model by understanding a firm as the type of entity which enters into many contracts and
most, if not virtually all of those contracts, are of a nature such that, assuming courts are
unbiased, the courts will reach correct conclusions regarding the parties' intentions as often
as they will reach incorrect conclusions. The cost of courts "getting it absolutely right" would
be greater, then, than the benefits to be realized from the enhanced level of acuity. So close
enough is good enough, now, in cases of horseshoes, hand grenades, and the typical contracts
of firms. The authors do recognize that there are some contracts with regard to which even
the largest firms would want courts to get it right:
[W]hen performance of a particular contract is important to the survival of the
firm-say, a contract with a major supplier--or when the contract is new and is
expected to be widely used, the firm may be unwilling to risk a seriously adverse
interpretation. If contextualists are correct that larger evidentiary bases do
shrink variance, then parties concerned with variance will likely prefer that
courts use a contextualist adjudicatory style.... On the other hand, only unusual
contracts have this "bet the ranch" quality. In the typical case, it is good enough
that courts get things right on average.
Id. at 576-77. It is not clear that the line Schwartz and Scott suggest in that excerpt would
have the obvious contours they seem to envision, or whether courts should make some type
of threshold determination before deciding what interpretive style to use. What is clear,
though, is that the line is, again, not so clearly between individual and firm contracts. Instead
the line seems to be drawn or "drawable" on the basis of the incidents of the particular
contract. The individual/firm dichotomy is an imperfect proxy for the autonomy-efficiency
dichotomy. See Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique
of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DEN. U. L. REV. 101 (2005).
32. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 29, at 550-54.
33. Id. at 544.
34. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2004).
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only the evidence that parties, ex ante, want courts to see."3 That
conclusion seems to rest an efficiency analysis on an autonomy
foundation: the courts should do what the parties want the court to
do; what champion of autonomy would differ with that conclusion?"
Of course the Schwartz and Scott analysis only merges efficiency
into autonomy, so far as Contract theory is concerned, if the
autonomy that Schwartz and Scott wind up with is the autonomy
deontological theory posits. Insofar as consequentialists discern
what actors do want by reference to what they should as rational
actors want they are not respecting autonomy in the same way
deontological autonomists would. But that would attribute to
deontological autonomists a sense of individual autonomy that does
not seem necessary to (or even supported by) their thesis. Whether
deontologists are founding their autonomy conclusions on Kant,37
Hegel, 8 or another alternative, nothing constrains them to a view
of autonomy that has the subjective trump the objective. 9 Insofar
as Contract is about interpersonal transactions, it cannot help but
rely on objective manifestation. Peter Benson confirms this:
The existence of these assents [offer and acceptance] as well as
the determination of their contents are decided in accordance
35. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 29, at 591 (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 1989) (supporting of the "four-corners" rule, Judge
Posner notes that "[plarties to contracts may prefer, ex ante ... to avoid the expense and
uncertainty of having a jury resolve a dispute between them, even at the cost of some
inflexibility in interpretation").
36. Schwartz and Scott confirm that construction of their consequentialist argument when
they describe the operation of merger clauses:
A merger clause, if honored, would limit the court to the [parties' integrated
writing]. Parties aware that the base was so limited would have a strong
incentive to write the contract in [terms as they are commonly understood]. By
adopting the merger clause, therefore, the parties signal to the court that this
incentive has motivated them to speak in [this majority language]. Thus, a court,
even if not persuaded by our more general argument that majority talk should
be the default language, should still interpret the inclusion of a merger clause
to mean that the parties wrote in majority talk.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 29, at 589-90.
37. See FRIED, supra note 5.
38. See Benson, supra note 1.
39. See R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 5 (1967) ("Since your and their
experience is invisible to me as mine is to you and them, I seek to make evident to the others,
through their experience 'of my behavior, what I infer of your experience, through my
experience of your behavior.").
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with the so-called objective test. By this test, it is the manifesta-
tion of assent as it reasonably appears to the other party that is
operative in bringing about [Contract] formation. The relevant
factor is not its author's state of mind; nor is the expression of
assent treated as evidence of his or her mental attitude. Rather,
the reasonably construed expression of assent in and of itself,
not the thought process that produced it, is the operative factor
in formation.4"
Further:
Since the objective test applies, the relevant point of view is
always how what is said or done by one party reasonably
appears to the other in the circumstances of their interaction.
And this appearance the first party, as a reasonable person, is
deemed to know. The cause of contract lies, then, entirely in the
interaction between the parties.41
Such necessary and inevitable recourse to the objective would seem
to undermine even the minimalist autonomy argument to the effect
that Contract preserves choice for the sake of preserving choice.
What is preserved is the ability to indicate what your choice is,
relying on objective indicia to do so. But Contract neither guaran-
tees that your indication will be received as you intend42 nor that
your choice will be respected even if clearly indicated.43
At this point it is worthwhile to pause in order to take stock.
Recognize that my claim is empirical. I do not assert that Contract
could not be based on either autonomy or consequentialist bases
alone; I assert that Contract doctrine is too imprecise to support
the argument that either perspective, or for that matter, even an
accommodation of both perspectives, could do anything like
explaining Contract. That is not because of the nature of Contract
theory; it is because of the nature of Contract doctrine. Review of
40. Benson, supra note 1, at 139 & n.27 (citing Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in the
Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85 (1919)).
41. Id. at 145.
42. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
19,21 (1981); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1932).
43. And that is true wholly apart from deal-policing mechanisms such as
unconscionability and impracticability; consideration, offer and acceptance, and notice of
acceptance requirements also confirm the conclusion in the text.
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efforts to account for the deontological-consequentialist duality of
Contract supports that conclusion and provides the necessary
predicate for observations about doctrine.
Professor Michael Trebilcock recognized the potential coincidence
of deontological and consequentialist theory:
[E]fficiency values, to the extent that they emphasize Paretian
notions of efficiency, might not, in most contexts, sharply diverge
from autonomy values; however, to the extent that Kaldor- Hicks
efficiency values are substituted for Paretian efficiency values,
these values become much more consequentialist and less
consistent with classical autonomy values.44
Trebilcock is certainly correct with regard to Paretian efficiency and
he could come even closer to concluding that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
resonates with autonomy were he to take an expanded but
deontologically defensible view of autonomy. That would explain his
hedging: "less consistent with classical autonomy values."4 5
Professor Jody Kraus, though, finds real purchase in a distinction
between deontology and consequentialism. He describes the differ-
ence as methodological-deontologists and consequentialists come
up with different answers because they are answering different
questions:
[All contract theories at least implicitly make both normative
and explanatory claims.... [The crucial second-order disagree-
ment between deontic and economic theories is over the relative
priority between explanation and justification, as well as the
contest between stated doctrine and case outcomes as sources of
law.... [Djeontic theorists are methodologically committed to
undertaking the justificatory task first, and explaining particu-
lar cases later, while economic theorists are methodologically
committed to undertaking the explanatory task first, and
justifying the existence of contract law later.4"
44. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 247 (1993).
45. Id. (emphasis added). It is only to this extent that Trebilcock "rejects the convergence
thesis." Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 688 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(emphasis added).
46. Kraus, supra note 45, at 696.
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Even were Kraus right about his characterization of deontologists'
and economists' relative methodological commitments (and I am not
sure that he is), I do not believe that he has on the terms he posits
discovered a substantial basis of distinction rather than a rhetorical
difference. Deontologists, at least those in the mold of Bensen and
Fried (the two Kraus engages), are no less interested in explaining
cases and the doctrine cases create in a common law system47 than
are economists (Kraus considers Trebilcock and Richard Craswell
specifically). Further, insofar as Kraus offers a methodological
distinction based on particular deontological and consequentialist
studies, he could establish no more than that "the theories are
making different kinds of claims about different things."4 That
intimates that the values vindicated by the two different methodolo-
gies may be consonant, or at least Kraus has not given us any
reason to conclude that they are not.
For present purposes, though, the problem with Kraus's "reconcili-
ation" of deontology and consequentialism in methodological terms
is with the impact that a failure to delineate the two perspectives
has on our understanding of Contract doctrine. Particularly, and
just for exemplary purposes, you can appreciate the deficiencies in
a pluralist Contract theory that would posit a vertical relationship
among deontology and consequentialism.
47. Kraus acknowledges that
[b]oth doctrinal statements and case outcomes appear to be co-equal sources of
law. Indeed, the relationship between stated doctrine and case outcomes appears
to be circular: doctrinal statements are distillations of principles derived from
previous cases' outcomes, and case outcomes are ostensibly determined by the
application of these distilled principles. The common law seems to consist in this
dynamic itself, rather than either the doctrinal statements or outcomes alone.
Yet particularly in hard cases, the question of which has priority over the other
seems to be forced. Which is the legal wheat to the other's legal chaff?
Id. at 692. The distinction Kraus draws then would only seem to matter in "hard" cases, cases
in which the doctrine under-determines result. But if doctrine under-determines result, it is
not clear how you could say very much about the operation of doctrine in that case, or about
a perspective's methodological commitment about doctrine generally based on such a case.
That conclusion is reinforced by the conception of doctrine advanced in this paper. Kraus
concludes that with regard to such "hard" cases deontologists adopt an ex ante perspective
and economists an ex post perspective. Id. at 701-03. I doubt that deontologists are as
concerned with the litigants in particular cases when they are writing about doctrine, which
is necessarily forward looking.
48. Id. at 689.
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In a 2001 article, Kraus pursued a "vertical integration strategy"
to reconcile "efficiency and autonomy contract theories [by constru-
ing them] as [comprising] logically distinct [elements] [within one]
unified theory."49 Of course, if the distinction between autonomy and
efficiency were only a matter of methodological predisposition, then,
at least, more work would need to be done in order to unify the two
in one theory. In the article, Kraus described an earlier methodolog-
ical effort as distinguishing autonomy from efficiency in terms of
what they endeavor to explain: "I argue [d] that four methodological
issues often divide efficiency and autonomy contract theories,
including the commitment of efficiency theories to explaining case
outcomes (and dismissing plain-meaning doctrinal statements) and
the commitment of autonomy theories to explaining plain-meaning
doctrinal statements (and ignoring or dismissing case outcomes)."'
That seems to represent a shift from Kraus's earlier basis of meth-
odological distinction: autonomy justifies and efficiency explains.
What remains, though, is an apparent ex post versus ex ante basis
of distinction: efficiency is forward looking (current litigants as a
means to an end) and autonomy is backward looking (current
litigants as an end in themselves).51
Ultimately, Kraus's shift, at least in terminology, is of no matter
to my thesis; we are not so much concerned with what different
questions vertically arranged theories may answer; we are instead
concerned with whether and how they may coexist vertically. Kraus
offers two vertical integration strategies.
First, one theory may be lexically prior to the other, in terms
that Thomas Scanlon52 and John Rawls" reveal. One theory, say
autonomy, may be lexically prior to another, say efficiency, because
the basic structure of Contract is justified in deontological terms
while the particular doctrinal elaborations of that basic structure
are justified in consequentialist terms.54 That seems to be just
49. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, in 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 422 (2001).
50. Id. at 437 n.3.
51. Kraus, supra note 45, at 701.
52. Kraus, supra note 49, at 423 (citing THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER
(1998)).
53. Id. (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
54. Autonomy as foundational and efficiency as derivative is the relationship Kraus uses
for purposes of his illustration and argument. Id. at 425. But there is no reason the two could
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another way of saying that, though X may be the foundation and Y
the elaboration therefrom, once X is in place Y can be understood as
necessarily consistent with X.55 That begs the question: Are we to
entertain challenges to particular assertions of Y as inconsistent
with X and, therefore, morally indefensible? Kraus concludes: 'Both
[Scanlon's and Rawls's] accounts allow other normative principles
to determine the kind and detail of the social institutions consistent
with lexically prior normative principles."56 We have not resolved
the theoretical tension; we have shifted it.
Second, Kraus posits a different relationship between theories
that may accommodate their coexistence: Foundational versus
Derivative Normative Theories.5" Kraus also discovers this concep-
tion in Rawls, which amounts to the claim such that if you start
with a particular normative theory, then all elaborations there-
from must be consistent with that theory.58 That is like saying that
if all life is carbon-based, whatever is "alive" will contain carbon.
So if the foundation of Contract is autonomy, all explanations of
Contract doctrine in consequentialist terms are derivative of that
deontological foundation. If Contract "doctrine" exists that is not
not be reversed. See id. at 428. Though if we were to find such a reason we probably would
have gone a long way toward resolving the deontology-consequentialism tension in Contract
theory (and Law). Kraus does suggest two reasons for the ordering he posits:
(1) The normative credentials of the economic analysis of law, including the
economic analysis of contract law, have not been, and are not likely to be,
established, and (2) The normative implications of autonomy theories for fine-
grained institutional analysis have not been, and are not likely to be,
established.
Id. at 428. My only reaction is that the arguments could as well be reversed so far as Contract
doctrine is concerned; at least, that is what I think all the fuss is about. Kraus does devote
substantial space in his Vertical Integration piece to the tension he discovers between
autonomy and wealth maximization theories. See id. at 428-36. Though Kraus recounts bases
for doubting the "normative credentials of the economic analysis of law" and the "normative
implications of autonomy theories for fine-grained institutional analysis," he seems to assume
that there is no reason to doubt the normative credentials of autonomy theories and the
normative implications of economic analysis of law for fine-grained institutional analysis. Id.
at 428. Others have. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy
of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law
After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).
55. "Scanlon's moral principle is lexically prior to any other normative principles because
it sets out a necessary condition for the legitimacy of any social institution and any rule
within it." Kraus, supra note 49, at 426 (emphasis added).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. See id.
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consistent with that deontological foundation, then it is not actually
"Contract," but it will not be "not Contract" just because it can be
explained in consequentialist terms. This too seems to avoid the
crucial issue: What is the relationship between deontology and
consequentialism in Contract such that we can say that one is
foundational and the other derivative? And what contribution can
our understanding of Contract doctrine make to our effort to resolve
that issue?
Judge Easterbrook's "agreement" doctrine59 and James Gordley's
work6 ° demonstrate, in different ways, the incoherence of positing
a unitary normative theory of Contract. And Kraus has not man-
aged to make the case for Contract theory's coherence in plural
terms. 1 That does not mean that the case for vertical or horizontal
pluralist theories cannot be made. That is just to say that it has not
yet been made. It remains, then, to suggest why the effort to find
coherence has been frustrating and may, ultimately, prove unavail-
ing. The answer is not to be found in the available theories or our
understanding of them; it is to be found in our misunderstanding of
the nature of doctrine.
III. DISCOVERING DOCTRINE
Insofar as Contract theory, in order to be a theory of Contract,
must explain and justify doctrine-that is what doctrinal theories
do, after all-we need to start with a conception of doctrine that
understands both the constituents of doctrine and our engage-
ment with those constituents.62 Efforts to offer a theory of Contract
are dependent on a comparison of theory with doctrine, so a
correct sense of what doctrine is by nature is crucial to the project.
Attempts heretofore to develop a unitary or plural concept of
Contract theory in a manner considerate of Contract doctrine
59. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
61. And so, too, those who build on ideas such as Kraus's "vertical integration" could not
convince. See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1499 (2005) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 4) (building a vertically integrated theoretical
structure of contract in terms of liberty: "Both values [autonomy and efficiency] ought to be
pursued, but where they conflict, autonomy should act as a 'trump' value").
62. Certainly Dworkin did this, but in a far too fictional, or at least idealistic, form. See
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 226 (1986) (discussing law as integrity).
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misunderstand what doctrine is. That is not to say that they
misunderstand particular instances of doctrine, or understand
particular instances insufficiently; they misunderstand the very
nature of doctrine.63
Recall that doctrine too (like theory) is heuristic; it abstracts
in order to operate at a remove from facts.' Certainly if the
deontologists were correct about Contract's theory, each Contract
rule might expressly incorporate something like "fairness," as, in
fact, a number of Contract rules do.65 Similarly, if consequentialists
were right, Contract rules would devolve into something like the
63. The individual patterns of cognition fundamental to Contract theory demonstrate that
idiosyncrasy and, therefore, variety determine what we consider to be doctrine. See Peter A.
Alces, On Discovering Doctrine: "Justice" in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 499-
507 (2005).
64. See id. at 513 ("The source of the consensus sufficient for Law ... is in the scope of the
common area among the heuristic patterns of the human agents subject to the Law.").
65. There are many other contexts in which the contract law relies on justice, or its
cognates, to fix the rights of the parties rather than as an after-the-fact explanation for a
decision. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) (entitled "Promise for
Benefit Received") (using the language, "extent necessary to prevent injustice"); id. § 94
("Stipulations") ("to the extent that justice requires enforcement"); id. § 139 ("Enforcement by
Virtue of Action in Reliance") ('The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice
requires."); id. § 158 ("Relief Including Restitution") ("grant relief on such terms as justice
requires"); id. § 173 ("When Abuse of a Fiduciary Relation Makes a Contract Voidable")
(contract voidable unless "it is on fair terms"); id. § 176 ("When a Threat is Improper") ("A
threat is improper if ... the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing."); id.
§ 184 ("When Rest of Agreement is Enforceable") ("reasonable standards of fair dealing"); id.
§ 190 ("Promise Detrimental to Marital Relationship') ("fair in the circumstances"); id. § 195
('Term Exempting from Liability for Harm Caused Intentionally, Recklessly or Negligently")
(term unenforceable unless "fairly bargained for"); id. § 205 ("Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing") (pervasive duty of "good faith and fair dealing"); id. § 223 ("Course of Dealing")
("fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding"); id. § 243 ("Effect
of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving Rise to a Claim for Damages for Total Breach")
(such impairment of value of contract to injured party "that it is just in the circumstances to
allow him to recover"); id. § 260 ("Application of Payments Where Neither Party Exercises his
Power") ("just regard to the interests of third persons, the debtor and the creditor"); id. § 272
('Relief Including Restitution") (if other apposite rules "will not avoid injustice, the court may
grant relief on such terms as justice requires"); id. § 351 ("Unforeseeability and Related
Limitations on Damages") ("court may limit damages ... if it concludes that in the
circumstances justice so requires"); id. § 354 ("Interest as Damages") ("interest may be allowed
as justice requires"); id. § 358 ("Form of Order and Other Relief') ("order of specific
performance ... on such terms as justice requires"); id. § 371 ("Measure of Restitution
Interest") (measurement of restitution interest "as justice requires"); id. § 384 ("Requirement
That Party Seeking Restitution Return Benefit") (compensation in place of return of property
in restitution "ifjustice requires that compensation be accepted") (emphases added throughout
note).
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Hand Formula in tort,' which they generally do not.6 7 But Contract
doctrine is not so formulated.' The real work of doctrine is done
"under the radar." The morality of Contract, Contract's moral
compass, is obscured by doctrine. In a very real way, we may even
conclude that that is an object of formulating doctrine.
Because doctrine obscures morality in order to accomplish its
heuristic object, the proper way to appreciate the operation of
doctrine is by reference to its effect on, for lack of a better word, the
"consumer'69 of doctrine: the transactors, their legal advisors, the
courts that apply doctrine (as well as those who teach it and learn
it). The "morality" of any law or body of law is directly related to its
"predictability"; not predictability in the sense of foreseeability, but
the ability to predict what, for instance, the "bad man"70 would do.
The point is crucial and difficult: in order to reach a conclusion
about the morality (whether deontological or consequentialist) of a
law, we must be able to appreciate the relationship between the law
and that morality in linear terms. Linearity, here, connotes our
ability to trace a direct relationship between a moral theory, say
autonomy, and a doctrinal prescription or proscription that vindi-
cates that moral theory.7 An example would be a legal rule that
says, in a controversy between A and B, reach the result that best
recognizes the autonomy of the parties, or that directs resources to
the party in the best position to exploit them. To the extent that
doctrine does not take that form-and it generally does not-the
relation between a particular doctrine, such as the agreement
66. See supra note 3.
67. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 (1981) (setting forth formulaic
"alternative" measures of damages where the loss caused by breach cannot be readily
quantified).
68. Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 282 (1980) ("[lit is quite possible
to draft an entire legal system without using normative vocabulary at all.").
69. The perspective of the consumer determines the nature and extent of the doctrine. See
Alces, supra note 63, at 515-16 ("If a pattern is inaccessible to human agents, there is no
pattern .... The fact that a pattern is manifest, i.e., in convention, acknowledges accessibility
and is evidence of a pattern.").
70. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
71. This linearity may be only unidirectional. See STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF
SCIENCE 551 (2002) ("[I]t is rather easy to generate complex behavior by starting from simple
initial conditions and then following simple sets of rules. But the point is that if one starts
from some particular piece of behavior there are in general no such simple rules that allow
one to go backwards and find out how this behavior can be produced.").
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requirement72 or operation of a preexisting legal duty rule,73 and a
moral perspective is obscure, even nonexistent. If that connection is
lacking, then there is not a linear relation between doctrine and (a
particular) morality; the progression from the doctrine's operation
to a particular moral result would be random in the sense of not
being predictable. That randomness intimates amorality (perhaps
even immorality);74 non-randomness, predictability with regard to
the relation between phenomena and a rule which would apply to
them, would be morality, or at least could reveal a particular moral
perspective. Understanding the nature of doctrine, though, makes
clear that such non-randomness is impossible.
Doctrine, in fact, is not the mere statement or formulation of the
rule-in restatement or common law or statutory form-but is,
instead, the operation of that formulation on transactors and
transactions; therefore, morality cannot be discovered in doctrine.75
And because doctrine is not static-it cannot be if it is to be forward
looking (and, tautologically, to be doctrine it must be forward
looking)-we can only really discover what doctrine is at a point in
time and space (broadly construed to include varying transactional
patterns).7" Though we may be able to configure a normative theory
(unitary or plural) to account for particular expressions of a rule, we
will not have thereby captured the doctrine. Indeed, if we could, it
72. See supra text accompanying notes 13-22 (discussing Easterbrook's approach to
agreement in ProCD).
73. The rule precludes enforcement of contract modifications not supported by "new"
consideration, but may be subject to defeasance by operation of ancillary rules that inartfully,
or at least surreptitiously, accommodate enforcement of the modification when the risk of an
unconscientiously imposed modification is not present. See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 64 (4th ed. 2001). The Uniform Commercial Code responds to
the same problem by focusing directly on transactor good faith, see U.C.C. § 2-209 (2004), and
so concedes the indeterminancy of "doctrine."
74. See Alces, supra note 63, at 513 ("[Wle are likely to conclude that insufficient
coincidence [among the thought processes of the consumers of doctrine] constitutes
randomness. And randomness is a manifestation of amorality, the want of legal morality ....
'Random justice' is an oxymoron and contract agreement based on random justice is fatally
insubstantial: It fails as doctrine.").
75. See generally id.
76. Due to our ability to view doctrine only from a particular point in time and space, we
may never be able to predict the direction in which doctrine is headed. Like Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle, "the more accurately you measure where a particle [for example,
contract doctrine or law) is, the less accurately you are able to measure where it's going."
Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from
Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1989).
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would no longer be doctrine in the organic sense that I have in
mind.
But we can go even further.
In fact, the object of abstracting as we do to formulate doctrine is
to "wring" the morality out of it, to abstract from normative
premises to accomplish a heuristic purpose. Heuristics (and, recall,
doctrine is a heuristic) necessarily involve both "discrimination" and
"leverage":
"Discrimination" refers to our ignoring portions of the data that
can be ignored without impairing the message of the data
(reducing the size of the data pattern to make it more manage-
able). "Leverage" refers to our ability ... to focus on regularities
without becoming distracted by the particulars that are not
pertinent to the perceptual or analytical exercise.77
Those incidents effectively undermine efforts to attribute persistent
normative qualities to doctrinal formulations.
Ultimately, any effort to identify the morality of a doctrine is
really an effort to tell a normative story about the progress of
doctrine. We can no more formulate the moral foundation of, for
example, the consideration doctrine than we can measure the
duration of the present. Doctrine is in a constant state of morphing
and, perhaps, becoming; it is constantly becoming something to
some degree-in normative terms--different for each "consumer" of
it.v" We rely on sufficient coincidence of doctrinal perspective to keep
the trains running on time,vs but all we can ever have is sufficient
coincidence (and too often-in the case of particularly dynamic areas
of the law, for example, "rolling contracts" such as the contract in
ProCDS°-maybe not even that).
77. Alces, supra note 63, at 505 (footnote omitted).
78. I pursue this analysis at length in id. at 499-511 (drawing on complexity theory to
suggest a structure of doctrine's formulation).
79. See id. at 513-14.
80. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 13-22 and
accompanying text (discussing ProCD).
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that extant theories of Contract fail
because they do not account for the nature of doctrine. Insofar as
the object of theory is to make sense of doctrine, it is crucial to
appreciate the nature of doctrine before a theory of doctrine will be
much help. I have posited a conception of doctrine that reveals why
the deontological or consequentialist theories, as well as their
iterations in plural form, cannot support doctrine so (and, I would
say, accurately) conceived.81 There are consequences for a morality
of Contract in the extant theories' failure to come to terms with the
nature of doctrine.
We can appraise the morality of Contract, and Contract's relation
to morality (a normative theory such as deontology or con-
sequentialism or some amalgam of the two), by observing the non-
randomness, the predictability, even the linearity perhaps, of the
progression from a normative perspective to law, Contract doctrine.
Legal morality (the normative function Law serves) only has
meaning in the phenomenal realm, because legal morality (law's
ability to coordinate, to offer expertise, and to provide efficient
results'2) is a corporate concept. Each law and ultimately the Law
is moral only to the extent that the common areas among the
heuristic patterns that comprise doctrine are non-random, predict-
able by reference to a normative criterion.83 That is all legal
morality can mean. A failure of Contract theory so far is that it
understands that legal morality can mean something other than
that. Once that confusion is revealed, the inevitable deficiency of
Contract theory is manifest. Understanding Law and morality as
related, in the manner urged here would understand them, provides
the means to appreciate the Law-morality relation in a way that
may advance the theoretical inquiry, at least so far as it matters to
Contract. If nothing more, it may clear the jurisprudential air.
81. See supra Part II.
82. There can be no "coordination, expertise, and efficiency." LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY
SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULEs 14 (2001) (emphases removed).
83. There is no legal morality where the structure those overlapping heuristic patterns
create appears-can only be perceived to be-random.
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